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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
And THE BAR
VOLUME XXVIII NOVEMBER, 1921 NUmEER 1
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
By William Gorham Rice, Jr.*
I. THE PRESENT EXTENT OF DECLARATORY RELIEF.
A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS.
I do not intend to give the honorable pedigree of the declaratory
judgment nor make an argument in its behalf. Both have been well
done by Professor Borchard.' Legal periodicals have published suf-
ficient discussions of the subject during the last four years. I will,
therefore, devote myself to the constitutional question.
The unconstitutionality of declaratory judgments had not been
suggested, so far as I can discover, until last autumn the decision of
Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co.,2 with due process of law executed
on the guillotine of unconstitutionality the statute of Michigan
which had been "prepared under the supervision of a
committee of the State Bar Association." This decision
has provoked considerable unfavorable comment in both legal and
lay publications. Is it good law? If so, is the similar section of the
New York Civil Practice Act doomed? Are acts of the same purport
of other states doomed?
To answer these questions we must know these statutes and also
know what powers the courts exercise apart from them. The first
general use of the declaratory judgment in a common law jurisdic-
' Member of the New York State Bar.
1 28 YAL. L. J.-1, 105.
2 211 Mich. 633, 179 N. W. 350 (1020).
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tion was in England, where it was introduced in a limited form
from Scotland by the Chancery Procedure Act of 1850. An amend-
ment of 1852 provided that "No suit . . . . shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a merely declaratory decree or order is
sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the court to make binding
declarations of right, without granting consequential relief." This
was interpreted to empower the court at the plaintiff's option to give
declaratory relief only in those cases in which he might have got-
ten consequential relief.3 This provision was enacted substantially
without change in Rhode Island in 1876.4 Since then it has been
several times reenacted and now reads: "No suit in equity shall be
defeated on the ground that a mere declaratory decree is sought, but
the court may make binding declarations of right in equity without
granting consequential relief. "5 The provision was given the narrow
English construction above mentioned. In such a plight the sta-
tute was nearly valueless. But in England where the nearness of
the Scotch example was potent, the scope of the declaratory judg-
ment has been greatly enlarged by statute.7
In this country several states have statutes authorizing declara-
tory construction of wills. For instance, the New York Code of
Civil Procedure s empowers the surrogate's court, upon petition by
an interested party, to determine "as to the validity, construction
or effect of any disposition of propefty contained in a will'-' pro-
bated in the court. And this provision is retained in the new Sur-
rogate Court Act.9 It has been repeatedly construed but I do not
find that its constitutionality has ever been questioned.
New Jersey has gone further, but has limited declaratory power,
like Rhode Island, to equity courts. The Chancery Act'0 contains
these words:
"Subject to rules, any person claiming a right cognizable in
a court of equity under a deed, will, or other written instru-
ment may apply for the determination of any question of con-
Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 Kay & J. 753, 760 (1856).
PUBLiC LAWS, ch. 563, § 17.
GENERAL LAWS, 1909, ch. 289, § 19.
C Hanley v. Wetmore, 15 R. I. 386 (1886).
Order 25, Rule 5, of the SUPREME COURT RULES or 1883, empowered the courts
to make a declaration in any sort of action "whether any consequential relief is
or could be claimed or not," and Order 54A of the RULES Or 1893, provided for the
construction at the request of an interested party of any "deed, will, or other instru-
ment." Similar rules of court exist today in the British self-governing colonies.
8 Section 2615.
9 Section 145.
10 PUBLIC LAws, 1915, ch. 116, §7.
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struction thereof, in so far as the same affects such right, and
for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested."
This new jurisdiction of equity has been invoked and exercised
in cases of wills,"' conveyances,'12 and contracts." The cases cited
are typical of the series. In none of them has the unconstitutional-
ity of the statute been suggested. In fact it seems impossible to dis-
tinguish the power that an equity court has long had to entertain a
trustee's bill for directions, 4 from the power the statute gives it to
act on an executor's petition for the construction of a will. 5 And
if the executor is allowed to have the will construed, there would
seem to be no constitutional objection to allowing any interested
party to obtain the construction of a will or of any other instrument.
The Florida and Wisconsin statutes of 1919,16 which provide for
equitable declaratory relief, seem not yet to have been considered
by thi higher courts. Of the Kansas statute which took'effect Febru-
ary 23, 1921, a writer says:
"The Michigan court regarded the statute of that state as
countenancing moot cases and advisory opinions and, fearing
judicial tribunals were to be degraded into bureaus of legal in-
formation, the court took advantage of a moot case to kill the
statute. The Kansas legislature precluded all possibility of such
an interpretation by confining operation of its enactment to"--
I now quote the words of the statute itself-- 'cases of actual
controversy," "of actual antagonistic assertion and denial of
right."17
So recent a statute has of course not yet been considered by the
higher courts.
The American Judicature Society has proposed a procedure
statute containing declaratory judgment provisions based largely on
English experience.'8 This part of their draft statute has been re-
published in the "Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1920"'9 where it is erron-
eously entitled "The English Act." A tentative draft of a
11 In re Ungaro, 88 N. J. Eq. 25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917), the first case under the
statute; Ilers v. Persons, 111 Atl. 638 (1920).
3 Renwick v. Hay, 90 N. J. Eq. 148, 106 Atl. 547 (1919).
33 Town of Kearny v. city of Bayonne, 90 N. J. Eq. 499, 107 Atl. 169 (1919).
" Trenton Trust Co. v. Cook, 88 N. J. Eq. 516, 103 Atl. 473 (1918).
is Snyder v. Taylor, 88 N. J. Eq. 513, 103 At. 396 (1918).
18 FLORIDA GE)9ERAL ACTS, 1919, ch. 7857; wIscONsN SESSION LAws, 1919,
ob. 242.
17 7 J. OF THE Am. BAR ASS'N 107.
Is B3u TN 14.
1g Page 181.
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uniform declaratory judgment statute prepared by a committee
of the conference is added ;2o this has now been revised.
21
B. JUDICIAL POWER UNDER AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS.
"Section 473. Declaratory judgments. The supreme court
shall have power in any action or proceeding to declare rights
and other legal relations on request for such declaration
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, aid such
declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. Such pro-
visions shall be made by rules as may be necessary and proper
to carry into effect the provisions of this section."
This is the provision of the New York Civil Practice Act which
takes effect this autumn. Is it constitutional?
Though this question is purely a question of conformity with the
state constitution, yet my remarks have no peculiar applicability to
New York state. This question is being asked in other jurisdictions
which have adopted or are thinking of adopting declaratory judg-
ment laws. I have put the question specifically with relation to New
York because there we have the unusual situation of a provision
that is actually enacted but has not yet gone into effect. Also be-
cause in the New York constitution the powers of the judicial de-
partment are defined in only the most general terms: "The Su-
preme Court is continued with general jurisdiction in law and
equity."22 There is no explicit separation of powers, but the sepa-
ration is implied as it is in the Federal Constitution.23
In a unanimous decision, Matter of Mitchel v. Cropsey, 4 the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court said:
"Our constitution divides governmental powers into three
branches; by its terms it confers one, the legislative, on the
Senate and Assembly; another, the executive, upon the Gover-
nor and Lieutenant-Governor; and it then continues and
creates courts and provides for the exercise of judicial powers.
Undoubtedly these governmental powers are distinct in their
-very nature. Their separation is essential to freedom, and a
union of the three in one person or body leads to tyranny.
' Page 188.
21 Page 91. See Professor Borchard's article on this revised draft In 34 HARv. L.
Env. 697.
= Art. 6, § 1.
= Art. 3, § 1, declares that "The legislative power of this state shall be vested
In the Senate and Assembly," and Art. 4, begins "The executive power shall be vested
In a Governor." Art. 5, be it noted, treats of certain inferior executive afficers and
Art. 6 opens with the words I have quoted. There is no explicit vesting of judicial
power in the courts.
2A 177 App. Div. 663, 668 (N. Y. 1917).
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These principles have been vigorously set forth by our Court
of Appeals (P. ex rel. Burby v. Howland, 155 N. Y. 270; Vil-
lage of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, etc. Co., 191 N. Y.
123), but are nowhere more tersely expressed than in a resolu-
tion of the Circuit Court of the United States, composed of
Chief Justice Jay and Justices Cushing and Duane, in refusing
to perform as a court certain non-judicial functions attempted
to be cast upon it by Congress. The resolution is as follows:
'That by the Constitution of the United States, the government
thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches,
and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose,
encroachments on either. That neither the legislative nor the
the executive branches can constitutionally assign to the judici-
ary any duties but such as are properly judicial and to be per-
formed in a judicial manner.' (Foctnote to Hayburn's Case, 2
Dall. 409.) The resolution passed in 1792 is equally true today,
and of our state as well as of the United States Constitution. A
purely legislative or executive function cannot be cast on the
courts, for that would violate the provisions of the Constitution
vesting the legislative power in the Senate and Assembly and
the executive power in the Governor. But this line of demarca-
tion has never'been so artificially drawn as to prevent assign-
ment to justices of this court of duties which relate to their gen-
eral powers, or which call for the exercise of judgment or of
that peculiar knowledge and skill which are the result of judi-
cial experience. Many duties of this character are exercised by
justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the County Court,
instances of which are aclmowledgment of deeds, adoption of
children, appointment of commissioners of condemnation, ap-
proval of certificates of incorporation, guardianship of chil-
dren and the insane."
Perhaps this opinion shows a greater willingness to do semi-judi-
cial work than some courts would manifest. But the New York
courts will not be put upon by the legislature. In Riglander v. Star
00.25 the court held unconstitutional, as an infringement of judicial
power, the provision in Section 793 of the Code of Civil Procedure
that "the court or justice must designate a day certain, during that
term, on which day the said causes [those to be preferred] shall be
heard. "
Nor is the New York judiciary disposed to give legal advice. In
Matter of State Industrial Commission,26 the Court of Appeals dis-
misses an appeal from the Appellate Division on the ground that it
z 98 App. Div. 101 (N. Y. 1904), affd. without opinion in 181 N. Y. 531, 73 N. E.
1131 (1905).
224 N. Y. 13, 16, 119 N. E. 1027 (1918).
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had no authority to give the Tndustrial Commission an advisory
opinion and that the opinion it gave had therefore no binding
force. Section 23 of the act creating the Commission authorized an
appeal to the Appellate Division from an award or decision of the
commission. Then it provided that "The Commission may also in
its discretion certify to such Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court, questions of law involved in its decision." Here the Com-
mission had certified a question as to its powers which had not act-
ually arisen. There were no adverse parties before the court,
though persons that were interested were allowed to appear and
file briefs merely as "friends of the court striving to enlighten
its judgment."
"In that situation," says Judge Cardozo, "our duty is not
doubtful. The function of the courts is to determine contro-
versies between litigants [citing United States cases] . . They
do not give advisory opinions. The giving of such opinions is
not the exercise of a judicial function. . . In the United States
no such function attaches to the judicial office in the absence of
express provision of the Constitution . .. In this state the leg-
islature is without power to charge the courts with the perfor-
mance of non-judicial duties (Matter of Dayies, 168 N. Y. 89)
W .. e are asked by an omnibus answer to an omnibus ques-
tion to adjudge the rights of all. That is not the way in which
a system of case law develops. We deal with the particular in-
stance and we wait till it arises."
So much for the opinion of the New York courts on the powers
the constitution assigns to them. Their attitude I believe is fairly
typical. Even states that have express prohibitions on the exercise
of powers of any department by officers of any other have been con-
strained to admit that a complete separation of powers is impossible
both analytically and practically. By using a term su6h as adminis-
trative or by giving a franldy more generous interpretation of the
doctrine of separation of powers, such as in the New York case first
quoted, the courts have generally supported the constitutionality of
laws creating the innumerable officers and boards that have been
endowed with a combination of executive, legislative, and judicial
authority. 7 In Massachusetts for instance, where Article 30 of the
Declaration of Rights forbids each department by name from exer-
cising powers of each other department the courts have without a
2 See also State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 180, 99 N. W. 636 (1904).
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qualm acted under a statute giving them power to review removals
from the civil service. 28 Certainly Massachusetts has been no more
scrupulous in the maintenance of the separation of powers than
have other states whose constitutions are less explicit.
But the declaratory judgment involves a question of constitution-
ality slightly different, for the power to make declaratory judg-
ments can hardly be classed as legislative or executive by any
stretch of the imagination. If it is not judicial, it is an outcast
among governmental powers, a power that no government with the
American type of constitution can wield. This would be a most un-
fortunate conclusion, for it is a power that has proved a great con-
venience to the people of most of the countries of the civilized
world. Is it impossible for us to follow the example of our European
and American neighbors by enabling our judges to decide legal
controversies before they reach the point of causing legal injury?
Is it beyond the purview of our constitutions that men be allowed
to learn what their rights and obligations in a particular situation
are, from the authority which will eventually pass upon them in
the event of their being charged with exceeding the former or fail-
ing in the latter?
C. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN LIMITED FIELDS.
Before discussing the Michigan Act, which has been declared un-
constitutional, it is well to note particular situations where, apart
from any general power to give declaratory relief, the courts give
judgments which are in their nature declaratory.
Without going back to very primitive law in which it would seem
that the court, ordering nothing itself, merely declared whether
the plaintiff might use his own right hand to remedy the wrong that
had been done him, and without considering other systems of law,
such as the Roman or the canon, we find several instances of de-
claratory judgments in the old common law writs. 29 It is true that
2 "The power to appoint and the power to remove officers are in their nature exe-
cutive powers," said the court in Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482, 488 (1881). The
legislature then enacted that certain persons might be removed only after a hearing
and gave an appeal to the court. "Such a hearing, although held before an officer whose
main functions are executive, is in the nature of a judicial investigation," says the
court in Driscoll v. tayor, 213 Mass. 202, 100 N. E. 640 (1913). "A statute which re-
quires a court to review the decision ... does not impose the performance of execu-
tive duties."
2 Such are the judgments upon the writs of quo jure, FITZHERBERT, NEw NATUnA
BREvium, 128F, and libertate probanda, FITZHERBERT, 77F. By the former the plain-
tiff seeks a declaration that defendant has no right of common in plaintiff's land;
by the latter plaintiff seeks a declaration of his freedom against one who claims
to hold him as villein. See mention also of the already obsolete (?) writ de proprietate
probanda in FITZnERBERT, 77D.
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these writs, like others instituting real actions, had gone out of use
before our Constitution was adopted. But the former existence of
them is at least some evidence that mere declarations of legal
rights may be judicial in their nature. And certainly the fact that
courts of many countries, and particularly of England, give de-
claratory relief today tends to show that there is no inherent im-
propriety in entrusting to a judicial body such authority.
However strong the analogy from foreign lands and ancient times
may be, a basis for the declaratory judgment must be found in our
own law. The constitution is invoked by the Mffichigan court to de-
stroy a statute "prepared under the supervision of a committee of
the State Bar Association." And though it is the Michigan con-
stitution alone that applies, the court devotes about two thirds of
its opinion to discussion of cases from other jurisdictions, counsel
for both sides having relied largely on them, the court thereby
recognizing that the constitutional question before it was not pecu-
liar to Michigan.
Professor Sunderland enumerated in his brief in the Anway Case
a number of situations in which courts now give declaratory re-
lief apart from general statutes allowing it."0 I can do no better
than repeat his enumeration. 1 Many of the cases are of statutory
origin, but the scope of the statute in each case is narrower than
that of the statutes previously discussed.
(1) Suits to quiet title and to remove clouds on title. A Con-
necticut statute2 goes far in extending this power of equity. It
provides that
"An action may be brought by any person claiming title to,
or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against
any person who may claim to own the same or any part there-
of, or to have any estate in the same . . . or . . . any interest
in the same. or any lien or incumbrance thereon . . . for the
purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest, or claim,
and to clear up all doubts and disputes, and to quiet and set-
tle the title to the same."
This statute has been the basis of judgment in Barri v. Schwarz
Bros. Co., 3 where the court construed certain conveyances in order
10 In 19 MICH. L. REv. 86, 89, he gives a more extended list.
51 I do not include one of his categories, however, that of cases where a stock-
holder seeks an injunction to forbid a corporation's paying a tax that he claims is Il-
legal. Here, as in many other cases, substantially the judgment is declaratory, but in
form consequential relief is sought.
32 PuBsic ACTS, 1915, ch. 174, p. 2003.
3 93 Conn. 501, 107 AtI. 3 (1919).
8
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to settle title to submarine land and riparian rights. There is no
suggestion that the constitutionality of the statute is subject to
doubt. The California,court, under Section 738 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, has as broad a power but with respect to real estate
only.3 4
(2) Application of trustees for instructions for carrying out
their trusts. The statutory extension of this privilege of having a
document construed, to executors and other persons interested un-
der a will is common, as has been said. 5 And we have noted the
cases under the New Jersey law ighich extends the privilege to per-
sons interested in a contract as well as those interested in a will.
(3) Proceedings to register title to land under the Torrens
Acts.3 6 These are similar to suits to quiet title, but the judgment is
good against the world not merely against particular defendants.
Destroyed Records Acts are similar.3 7
(4) Determination of heirs without an order of distribution.
By the Michigan statute such a determination is not res judicata,
but in several states it is.3 8  It is a little surprising that a court
so hostile to the declaratory judgment statute because it imposed
non-judicial duties on the courts should have acted under this heir-
ship statute without a qualm, though its action was entirely inde-
cisive. But the astounding thing is that the court in the Anway Case
distinguishes that statute from the one before it on this very
ground, saying in effect: "There the court was doing a judicial
act because it decided nothing; but it would be non-judicial for
us to declare rights without giving consequential relief." The
court's words are: 39
"Our inquiry here is as to whether we are called upon to ex-
ercise judicial power, to perform judicial functions .. .But
to resume the consideration of the cases thought to be applica-
ble by the proponents of this act . . .Counsel also say that in
proceedings to determine heirship the courts have exercised
powers analogous to those here involved. They say such deter-
minations of the courts are binding and cite us to Fitzpatrick
v. Simwnson Mfg. Co., 86 Minn. 140, which does so hold. One
difficulty in following this case, however, and it is a sufficient
one, lies in the fact that this court has held exactly the con-
84 See German-American Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 687, 102 Pac. 932(1909). See also CIVIL CODE, § 3367, subdtvhlon 3.
5 See, for example,-Estate of Russell, 150 Cal. 604, 89 Pae. 345 (1907).
as See Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907).
37 See Title Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356 (1906).
'3 See, for instance, In re Oxarart, 78 Cal. 109, 20 Pac. 367 (1889).
80 211 Micb. 592, 599, 607, 179 N. W. 350, 353, 355, 356 (1920).
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trary in Lorimer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 116 Mich. 682,
where our act was under consideration and where we said of
such proceedings:
" 'The act under which the proceedings were instituted does
not purport to make the proceedings of the probate court con-
clusive upon anybody. They are not binding even upon the
relator. The petitioner, or any other person interested, if not
satisfied with the findings, might, in any judicial proceeding,
resort to original evidence, and wholly ignore the action of the
probate court. The proceeding simply makes evidence, and
any common law jury could overturn it in any other pro-
ceeding.' "
(5) Determination of the validity of a bond issue before the
bonds are marketed." In an action brought under Section 3480 of
the California Political Code, the court considers at length the
dictum in Tregea v. Modesto District,41 that such a determina-
tion might not be within the judicial power of Fed1eral courts, but
it has no doubt of its constitutionality under California law, and
says: "By our decisions the constitutionality of the act has been
directly and impliedly passed upon and approved more than once.
And we will not enter into a discussion of that question." 2
(6) Determination of the validity of a marriage under Chapter
2352 of the Revised Laws of Wisconsin 1919 which was applied in
Kitzman v. Werner43 without its constitutionality being questioned.
The same court had said very broadly'in State ex rel. Milwaukee
Medical College v. Chittenden:"1
"Whenever the thing denominated status is a matter of
public importance lEy principles of common law or by the let-
ter or spirit of the written law, such as the condition of mar-
riage, citizenship, parentage, residence, legal settlement, and
many other matters that might be mentioned, the question in
respect thereto is a legitimate matter for judicial determination
by a tribunal having jurisdiction of the res."
The cases cited, however, are ones where such determination either
changed a status or else was accompanied by some consequential re-
do See Pioneer District v. Bradley, 8 Idaho 310, 68 Pac. 295 (1902).
In this connection it Is Interesting to note the West Virginia statute, ACTS OF
W. VA. 1917, ch. 57, conferring this power on the Attorney General, and the article
by Mr. Maurice T. Van Hecke in 27 W. VA. L. QUAn. 84, in which he reaches the
conclusion that this Is not a judicial but an administrative function.-The Editor.
164 U. S. 179 (1896).
42 People v. Linda Vista District, 128 Cal. 477, 61 Pac. 86 (1900).
' 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789 (1919).
' 127 Wis. 468, 504, 107 N. W. 500 (1906).
10
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lief. In either case the judgment .s not merely declaratory as it
may be under the recent Wisconsin statute.
(7) Determination of appeals by the state in criminal cases.
This is debatable territory. The United States Supreme Court has
held a statute authorizing such an appeal unconstitutional. 45 So has
Arizona.4 6 Some other courts have failed of unanimity but all
others sustain the law: Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kentucky,
Arkansas, and Kansas.4 7
To these classes that Professor Sunderland suggests, with which
may be compared Professor Borchard's enumeration of examples48
should be added at least three more, as follows:
(8) Determination of appeals in civil cases after they have be-
come moot. As in eximinal appeals, there are reasons of policy why
such appeals should not be allowed, such as the probability that they
will be badly argued and so waste the time of the court if not pro-
duce a poor opinion. It is clearly within the power of a court not to
consider moot appeals, but, though a constitutional objection to
them as moot cases might seem to exist, such appeals in equity
suits, at least, are often decided on their merits 9.4  Though the
United States Supreme Court has passed on such cases, the follow-
ing passage from United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische GeseIl-
sehaft,' in which it refused to follow these precedents, recognizes
this constitutional objection:
"While this mere outline shows the questions which are at is-
sue and which would require to be considered if we had the
right to decide the controversy, it at once further demon-
strates that we may not without disregarding our duty, pass
upon them because of their absolute want of present actuality."
A little later the Court refers approvingly to Director of Prisons v.
Court of First Irstance,51 where on appeal: "after the death pen-
alty had been inflicted on the accused, we .. .dismissed for want
of jurisdiction because the case had become a moot one."
(9) Suits against a state. Here judgment for the plaintiff is
merely declaratory of the amount the state owes. No execution is-
'5 United States v. Evrns, 213 U. S. 297 (1909).
to State v. Miller. 14 Ariz. 440, 130 Pac. 891 (1913).
47 See note on State v. Allen, 107 Kan. 407, 191 Pac. 476 (1920), In 19 MIcH. L.
REv. 79.
Is 28 Y.LE L. J. 1, 29-32.
"9 See 34 HARV. L. REV. 416.
0 239 U. S. 466, 475 (1916).31 239 U. S. 633 (1915).
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sues to enforce the judgment. Suits between states before the Su-
preme Court are of course specifically authorized by the Constitu-
tion. But "courts of claims" are of statutory creation and are held
constitutional. The difference between the earlier United States
statute giving an appeal from the United States Court of Claims to
the Supreme Court, which was held unconstitutional in Gordon v.
United States,52 and the present statute is that the latter provides:
"The judgment of said court or of the Supreme Court of
the United States, to which an appeal shall lie, as in other
'cases, as to the amount due, shall be binding and conclusive
upon the parties,"
whereas all previous statutes had made the judgment not "binding
and conclusive," but subject to an estimate or revision by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury."
(10) Judgments and decrees in favor of a defendant. In these
we have a judicial declaration that the plaintiff has not the claim
that he has asserted. A suit for a negative declaratory judgment is
exactly this, except that the declaration is made at the behest of
the party who in an ordinary case would be the defendant. The New
Mexico law of March 11, 1903,"4 which authorizes any one to compel
a person having a personal injury claim against him to bring his
case to court, is an example of this sort of action that is authorized
by a declaratory judgment law. This statute apparently has never
been put to use. The California Code of Civil Procedure55 gives a
more complete remedy. It provides:
"An action may be brought by one person against another
for the purpose of determining an adverse claim, which the
latter makes against the former for money or property upon
an alleged obligation."
This has been law since 1 8 5 1 6 and has been repeatedly applied
by the courts.5 7  Equity's power to cancel instruments for fraud
52 2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1864). For statute quoted below see U. S. Comip. STAT.
1916, § 1171.
1 "This court," says the Supreme Court in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128,
144 (U. S. 1871), "being of opinion that the provision for an estimate was incon-
sistent with the finality essential to judicial decisions, Congress repealed that provision.
Since then the Court of Claims has exercized all the functions of a court, and this court
has taken full jurisdiction on appeal."
6' Ch. 33, § 2.
5 Section 1050.
PRACTICE ACT, § 527.
' It may be remarked in passing that judgments for the defendant even under
ordinary procedure may be In substance in favor of the party who claims to have suf-
fered a legal wrong, as for example, in People cx rel. Tate V. Dalton, 158 N. Y. 204,
52 N. E. 1119 (1899). In this case a state employee who had been dismissed brought
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"quia timet" is closely analogous, though here in form an execu-
tory judgment is given. 8 At common law a plaintiff could prevent
judgment against himself by the simple expedient of absenting
himself at the time of the rendition of a verdict. Hence if a verdict
was directed for the defendant, plaintiff habitually withdrew. He
could sue defendant again at a more favorable time. This privilege
of nonsuit is now much cut down; but plaintiff still has the privi-
lege of deciding when he will bring his action. 9 By the negative de-
claratory judgment, the claim-holder's freedom in asserting his
claim is restricted a little further, for if the court approves, the
adverse party can compel him to litigate. This is recognizing that
an obligee as well as an obligor is entitled to a settlement of the
claim; it is subjecting to more complete judicial control the ob-
ligor's right to legal redress.
In short, we have the declaratory judgment already in many
portions of the law; in its negative form, indeed in every portion.
The declaratory judgment authorized by the Michigan Act is not
different in kind nor even in degree from judicial determinations
made every day.
II. THE ANWAY CASE.
It behooves us then to examine in some detail the decision in the
Anway Case with the hope of discovering why the court came to
the conclusion that this statute was unconstitutional. In the minority
opinion in which Mr. Justice Clark concurred, Mr. Justice Sharpe
sets forth with consideration and clearness the nature of judicial
power and presents a strong argument for the constitutionality of
the statute. He feels, however, that the facts of the case before the
court did not warrant any declaration in this case being made.
The facts, though they have scarcely any bearing on the question
to which I address my attention, are stated as follows by Mr. Jus-
tice Fellows, who writes the majority opinion:
"Briefly stated, the bill alleges that plaintiff is employed by
mandamus for reinstatement and the court refused relief declaring that his removal
was void, and that lie was still in~office. Another case in which the court gives plain-
tiff substantial satisfaction, though giving judgment for defendant is Baird V. Wells, 44
Ch. Div. 661 (1890), where the court declares plaintiff's expulsion from a social club
was not justified, but refuses to compel his reinstatement because no property right
is involved. See also German Savings Society v. Collins, 145 Cal. 192, 78 Pad. 637
(1904).
ts Commercial Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen 351 (Mass. 1867).
GO Also today a claim-holder may not prevent a positive judgment against him in
some cases, for the defendant in many states has a right to litigate counterclaims to
judgment in his favor.
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defendant street railway company as a conductor; that he de-
sires to work more than six days in consecutive seven days;
'he does not claim to have any such contract with defendant; he
claims no breach of any contract; he does not allege that de-
fendant has committed, or threatened to commit, any wrong
upon him, or that he has any claim, present or prospective, for
any damages from defendant; he seeks to have this court ad-
-vise him whether the defendant will violate the provisions of
Act 361, Public Acts 1919, if it should in the future permit him
to work more than six days in consecutive seven days. Stated
in the language of plaintiff's brief:
" 'The sole question in the case is as to the meaning of Act
No. 361 of the Public Acts of 1919. The precise question is:
Does that act make it unlawful for a street railway company
to allow its motormen or conductors or both to work more than
six days in any consecutive seven days of twenty-four hours
each if the conductors or motormen so desire ?
"The defendant railway company answers admitting the
llegations of the bill. Division 836. Amalgamated Association
of Street and Electric Railway Employes of America, inter-
venes. It is not claimed that the rights of any of these parties
-have been invaded, nor is there any threat of invasion of the
Tights of any one. No damages are claimed, nor is there
threat of any damage. The proceedings must rest, and rest
alone, upon Act 150 [of the Public Acts of 1919.]"
Perhaps it was the attempted use of the statute in so unpropitious
za situation of fact that unconsciously prejudiced the court against
it. Perhaps the phraseology of the statute that it was to be "liber-
ally construed and liberally administered with a view of making
the courts more serviceable to the people" offended the court's
sense of its own dignity. Possibly the same unwitting reaction
-was produced by the title of Professor Sunderland 's article "The
Courts as Authorized Legal Advisers of the People." 0
Certainly the court seems to have started with a prejudice
against the statute. This is shown first by the fact that the Anway
Case did not require a consideration of the constitutional question.
It could have been disposed of on the ground upon which Mr. Jus-
tice Sharpe relies. It is shown again by the fact that court, not coun-
sel, raised the question of constitutionality. Compare this with the
conduct of the same court in Walker v. Schultz61 where it refused to
consider exactly this question of constitutionality in a suit to quiet
00 54 AM. L. REv. 161.
6I 175 Micb. 280, 141 N. W. 543 (1913).
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title, because the question had not been raised in the circuit court.
Prejudice is also shown by the fact that the court-goes out of its
way to give the declaratory judgment a "reddish" tinge:
"Under our government the state does not till our farms,
manufacture our automobiles, conduct our great department
stores, or do our law business -for us. The unfortunate people
of one country are at present trying such experiment in gov-
ernment. "
And it says this despite the fact that it was well aware that the
powers granted by the Michigan act are exercised by the courts of
most of the civilized world.
It is shown, moreover, by the treatment it metes out to various
analogies suggested by counsel. The treatment it gives to one of
these, the statute authorizing the determination of heirship with-
out consequential relief, I have already discussed. Another example
is the New Jersey Chancery Act which is dismissed as irrelevant on
the ground that the cases under it have not "treated the constitu-
tional question" and that
"This court has for many years construed wills in equity cases
and in proper cases have [sic] recognized the jurisdictiQn of
the chancery court to construe wills, and such jurisdiction has
been exercised without question."
In other words an admitted extension of jurisdiction in New
Jersey (without its constitutionality being questioned) is treated
as no evidence that an analogous extension in Michigan is constitu-
tional, because this particular New Jersey extension has previously
been made in Michigan without its constitutionality being doubted.
The court moreover .ignores the fact that the New Jersey act ap-
plies to other instruments besides wills.
I will not attempt to consider in detail the preliminary pages of
the opinion which seem designed chiefly to produce in the reader a
frame of mind hostile to the statute, by distorting its content. A
single quotation will show the spirit of the court:
"Considering the act itself as well as the very able paper
by its author in volume 54, American Law Review, 161, under
the title "The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisers of the
People," it at once becomes apparent that by the act the
courts of this state are made the legal advisers of all seeking
such advice, not through their existing opinions in matters
15
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which have involved wrongs committed and redressed by such
tribunals, but in advance of any infringement of their rights,
any breaches of their contracts, and that in advance of any
existing controversy that they be advised by a declaration of
rights as to what the law is, or will be, in the event of future
breaches, future contingencies which may or may not happen.
Indeed, this is the essence of the measure. Before this court,
with its membership of eight, takes up the work of advising
3,000,000 people, and before the Legislature is called upon to
increase the membership of this court so as to efficiently con-
duct this work, it is well that this court pause long enough to
consider, and consider fully, whether the act calls upon us to
perform any duties prescribed by the Constitution or to exercise
any power therein conferred."
Before proceeding to consider the only legal question which is
presented by the case-whether the power conferred by the statute
is judicial or not-I will quote the corresponding passage from
Mr. Justice Sharpe's introductory pages:
"I am unable to concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fel-
lows holding Act No. 150 of the Public Acts of 1919 uncon-
stitutional. In my opinion, the construction which he places on
the provisions of the act is not warranted by the language em-
ployed. I can find nothing in the act itself which places upon
courts the duty to serve as "legal advisers of all seeking such
advice" in advance of any existing controversy.
"Let us now examine the act for the purpose of ascertaining
the duties therein imposed on the courts. It provides (section 1)
that-
c'No action or proceeding in any court of record shall be
open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory
judgment, decree or order is sought thereby, and the court
may make binding declarations of rights whether any conse-
quential relief is or could be claimed, or not, including the de-
termination, at the instance of any one claiming to be inter-
ested under a deed, will or other written instrument of any
question of construction arising under the instrument, and a
declaration of the rights of the parties interested.'
A. IS THE POWER OF EXECUTION ESSENTIAL?
The constitutional question is, in the words of Mr. Justice Fel-
lows, "whether we are called upon by the act to exercise judicial
power, to perform judicial functions." The nmjority hold that
the act imposes non-judicial duties, first because the judgment is
not executory, second because the case is moot. In the opinion these
16
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two grounds are not clearly differentiated. The first question,
and to Mr. Justice Sharpe the only question, is whether the giving
of a declaratory judgment, when this is what the plaintiff requests,
is an exercise of judicial power. It is to be remembered that in
this connection "judicial" means "within the realm where courts
may act," not, "within the realm Where courts alone may act."
This distinction was clearly made in Matter of Mitchet v.0rop-
sey 2 and it is obvious that the Michigan statute can
be held unconstitutional only if it attempts to give the courts a
power which is distinctly non-judicial, not merely not exclusively
judicial.
B. FEDERAL CASES RELIED ON.
The principal reliance of the majority is on United States Su-
preme Court cases. It may be mentioned in passing that it is pos-
sible that the Federal Constitution restricts the authority of Fed-
eral courts to something less than "judicial power," namely to
"cases" and "controversies." Such a possibility is suggested by the
fact that the Federal courts tend to view their jurisdiction as nar-
rower than do state courts, in some cases, such as those of irrigation
bonds and criminal appeals. But even if this jurisdiction is narrQw-
er, which I greatly doubt, there is little reason to believe that it ex-
cludes the rendition of declaratory judgments.
The Michigan court says of Muskrat v. United States :63 "This
case should forever put at rest this question. It is absolutely de-
cisive of the question before us." The majority quotes the following
passage from that case with no comment except the two sentences I
have just repeated.
"It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor less in
this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial deter-
mination, final in this court of the constitutional validity of an
act of Congress. Is such a determination within the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution, as the same has been in-
terpreted and defined in the authoritative decisions to which
we have referred? We think it is not. That judicial power, as
we have seen, is the right to determine actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of
proper jurisdiction. The right to declare a law unconstitutional
arises because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the
other of such parties in determining their rights is in conflict
with the fundamental law. The exercise of this, the most im-
" Supra, note 24.
03 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
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portant and delicate duty of this court, is not given to it as a
body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but be-
cause the rights of the litigants in justiciable controversies re-
quire the court to choose between the fundamental law and
a law purporting to be enacted within constitutional authority,
but in fact beyond the power delegated to the legislative branch
of the government. This attempt to obtain a judicial declara-
tion of the validity of the act of Congress is not presented in a
'case' or 'controversy,' to which, under the Constitution of the
United States, the judicial power alone extends. It is true the
United States is made a defendant to this action, but it has no
interest adverse to the claimants. The object is not to assert a
property right as against the government, or to demand com-
pensation for alleged wrongs because of action upon its part.
The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional
validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between
parties concerning a property right necessarily involved in the
decision in question, but in a proceeding against the govern-
ment in its sovereign capacity,' and concerning which the only
judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the
legislation in question. Such judgment will not conclude private
parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the question
of the constitutionality of such legislation. In a legal sense the
judgment could not be executed, and amounts in fact to no
more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the
acts in question. Confining the jurisdiction of this court within
the limitations conferred by the Constitution, Which the court
has hitherto been careful to observe, and whose boundaries it
has refused to transcend, we think the Congress, in the act of
March 1, 1907, exceeded the limitations of legislative auth-
ority, so far as it required of this court action not judicial in
its nature within the meaning of the Constitution."
The opinion expressed by the Supreme Court that this is not a
case or controversy seems based not alone on the fact that "the
judgment could not be executed," but equally on the fact that
"such judgment will not conclude private parties when actual liti-
gation brings to the court the question of the constitutionality of
such legislation." The court seems thus to set up two tests of judi-
ciality. And so do many other opinions that the Anway majority
quotes. Take, for example, Gordon v. United States, 4 where the
Supreme Court was considering the constitutionality of appeals
from judgments of the Court of Claims which under the statute were
61 2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1864).
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inconclusive without further governmental action. In one passage
Mr. Chief Justice Taney says :65
"The award or execution is a part and an essential part of
every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It
is no judgment in the legal sense of the term without it. With-
out such an award the judgment would be inoperative and
nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It
would be merely an opinion which would remain a dead
letter, .. ."
But he may be stressing the other test when he says:
"It is true the act speaks of the judgment or decree of this
court. But all that the court is authorized to do is to certify its
opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury, and if he inserts it in
his estimates and Congress sanctions it by an appropriation, it
is then to be paid but not otherwise. And when the Secretary
asks for this appropriation, the propriety of the estimate for
this claim, like all other estimates of the Secretary, will be
opened to debate, and whether the appropriation will be made
or not will depend upon the majority of each House. The real
and ultimate judicial power will, therefore, be exercised by the
legislative department; and not by that department to which
the Constitution has confided it."
The latter seems the prevailing test, for he comments on Hayburn's
Case6 as follows: "When the decision of the court was subject to
the revision of a Secretary and Congress, it was not the exercise
of a judicial power and could not therefore be executed by the
court." In other words the decision was non-judicial because
subject to revision, and incapable of execution because subject
to revision. But there is no intimation that its incapability of
execution made it non-judicial.
After quoting from this opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, Mr.
Justice Sharpe remarks:
"A careful reading of this opinion satisfies me that it was
based on the lack of finality in the conclusion to be reached and
judgment rendered by the court rather than the want of power
in the court to enforce obedience to its order. This view is em-
phasized by the opinion rendered by Chief Justice Chase (that
of Chief Justice Taney not having been filed) 2 Wall. 561, 17 L.
Ed. 921, in which he said:
" 'We think that the authority given to the head of an execu-
- 117 U. S. 697 (1864).
0 2 Dall. 409 (U. S. 1792).
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tive department by necessary implication in the fourteenth sec-
tion of the amended Court of Claims Act, to revise all the decis-
ions of that court requiring payment of money, denies to it the
judicial power from the exercise of which alone appeals can be
taken to this court.' "67
C. STATE CASES RELIED ON.
A state case, cited by the majority, contains a typical dictum
upon the limit of judicial power :68
"Where a complainant has sustained no injury and the ob-
ject of the action is merely to obtain a declaration as to the
constitutionality of a legislative act, the question presented to
the court is merely an abstract one and the action will be dis-
missed. * * *
"Abstract questions cannot be made the subject of an action.
They will not be answered, although it may appear that at some
time in the future they will probably be the subject of a real
controversy. A question which the courts will entertain must
be in an action or proceeding where the necessary parties are
before it, in which there is a subject-matter, and where the de-
termination of the court can be placed in a judgment or final
order forever controlling upon the parties and their privies,
and in which final process can be issued to carry the judgment
or order into effect."
Here, as in the Muskrat Case, the tests are enumerated as cumula-
tive, but finality of the judgment is the only test needed for the de-
cision reached.
To pile up quotations as to the nature of judicial power seems
fruitless. I have selected the opinions, outside of Michigan, which
seem most forcibly to support the majority opinion. A detailed
examination of the cases of any state would probably show but
slight variation. James Schoonmiaker of the St. Paul Bar has made
such an examination of the Minnesota law. 9 After criticizing the use
made in the Anway Case of In re Application of the Senat670 where
the court refused to give an advisory opinion, Mr. Schoonmaker
says:
67 The quotation that I have previously made-from United States v. Klein, 13 Wall.
128 (U. S. 1871), which sustained the constitutionality of appeals under a subsequent
modification of the Court of Claims statute bears out the opinion of Mr. Justice Sharp'e
for decislopis are now conclusrve but not executory.
63 Hanrahan v. Terminal Station Commission, 206 N. Y. 494, 100 N. E. 414
(1912).
So 5 MININ. L. REv. 172.
71 10 Minn. 78 (1865).
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"In 1868 . . . the same judges decided Home Insurance Co.
v. Flint [13 Minn. 244] and here is what they say concerning
the word 'judicial:' . . 'A judicial investigation proceeds
after notice and eventuates in a judgment, which is the final
determination of the rights of the parties, unless reversed by an
appellate tribunal. The necessity of notice in the inception, and
the conclusive character of the determination are perhaps as
good a test as any other, as to what proceedings are judicial.' "
I will not attempt to define judicial power. But I maintain that
wherever executory relief is applied as a test, conclusiveness of the
adjudication may be applied alternatively (except perhaps in
Michigan), and that the latter alone is a sufficient test and the
proper one.
The Michigan decisions, on which the court did not particularly
rely and some of which that I shall quote from, it did not even mem-
tion, certainly lay peculiar stress on execution. The memory of these
decisions must have remained with the court.
When, in the case of Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Co., 71 the pow-
ers of the Industrial Accident Board were attacked as un-
constitutional because they combined "executive, administrative
[sic], and judicial functions," they were supported on the
ground which has found favor in other states, namely, that the
board "is but an administrative body, vested, it is true with various
and important duties and powers, some of them quasi-judicial in
their nature, but'"--and here is where the Michigan court goes on
a frolic of its own- 'without that final authority to decide and ren-
der enforceable judgment which constitutes the judicial power. Its
determinations and awards are not enforceable by execution or other
process until a binding judgment is entered thereon in a regularly
constituted court. Sec. 13, pt. 3 of said act."
The section to which reference is thus made provides that after
adjudication of an accident claim by the Board "either party may
present a certified copy of the decision . . . to the circuit court for
the county in which such accident occurred, whereupon said court
shall, without notice, render a judgment in accordance therewith
against said employer . . . which judgment . . . shall have the
same effect as though duly rendered in an action duly tried and de-
termined by said court."
Here is the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine of separation of
- 187 Mich. 8, 18, 153 N. W. 49 (1915).
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powers. The court is making a mere mechanical putting into mo-
tion of the process of execution the only requisite of judicial power.
One would think it more appropriate that the process of execu-
tion be reckoned characteristic of executive power.
But though it does no harm to support on an absurd ground leg-
islation giving judicial or quasi-judicial power to the Industrial
Accident Board, it is baneful to apply such a criterion to thwart the
will of the legislature. And though it is relatively innocuous to say
that proceedings that can not eventuate in an executory decree are
not exclusively judicial, no good can come from holding that pro-
ceedings that can not eventuate in an executory decree are exclus-
ively non-judicial.
In the Mackin Case the court supports its opinion by quoting the
following passage from Underwood v. McDuffee :72
"The judicial power, even when used in its widest and least
accurate sense, involves the power to 'hear and determine'
the matters to be disposed of; and this can only be done
by some order or judgment which needs no additional
sanction to entitle it to be enforced. No action which is merely
preparatory to an order or judgment to be rendered by some
different body can be properly termed judicial."
In this earlier case, the principal objection to the, proceedings (be-
fore a referee), says the court, "is claimed to be found in the
clauses of the constitution which vested all the judicial power of
the state in courts and which provide how these courts should be
constituted, and, as is argued, leave no room for judicial power else-
where." Then follow the sentences quoted in the Mackin Case. The
court then cites a case holding that a sheriff presiding over b, jury
acted, not judicially, but "ministerially, because he had no power
to give judgment" and proceeds: "It is the inherent authority not
only to decide but to make binding orders or judgments which con-
stitutes judicial power." The court therefore holds that the decision
of a referee chosen by the parties is quite as unobjectionable as a
confession of judgment. The authorities cited do not justify the
court's statement that the sanction of execution is essential to judi-
cial power. Moreover the sentence last quoted shows that the court
does not differentiate between this test and the true one, the "bind-
ing" quality of the judgment rendered. The Declaratory Judgment
71 15 Mich. 361, 368 (1867).
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Act of Michigan uses this very word :7.3 "The court may make bind-
ing declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or
could be claimed or not."
I can not better close this part of my consideration of the Anway
Case than by quoting another passage from the minority opinion:
"The test to be applied, in my opinion, is: Will the judg-
ment or decree of the court settle for all time the rights of the
parties in the matter presented? A reading of the authorities
cited by Mvfr. Justice Fellows will, I believe, reveal the fact
that the determination of that question, as applied to the facts
in each particular case, was decisive of the conclusion reached
therein. I have been unable to find any case in which the re-
fusal of the court to act was necessarily based on its inability to
enforce obedience to its judgment or decree. While the opinions
in many cases refer to such want of power, the language so
employed will, I think, always be found to follow that in which
the court finds a lack of finality in the judgment sought.
"Herein lies the distinction between declaratory judgments
and moot cases or advisory opinions. The declaratory judg-
ment is a final one, forever binding on the parties on the is-
sues presented. The decision of a moot case is mere dictum,
as no rights are affected thereby, while an advisory opinion
is but an expression of the law as applied to certain facts not
necessarily in dispute and can have no binding effect on any
future litigation between interested parties."
Mr. Justice Sharpe, in the second paragraph is referring to the
other basis of the majority opinion, to wit, that the jurisdiction at-
tempted to be conferred by the statute is a jurisdiction to decide
moot cases. It is but fair to say that some of the cases I have hereto-
fore quoted from, notably the Muskrat Case, were used by the court,
it seems, principally in support of the proposition that a court can-
not decide a moot case.
D. WHAT IS A M00T CASE?
No one will deny that courts can not decide moot cases. But the
court fails utterly to show that cases within the declaratory judg-
ment statute are moot. All it says in this connection is contained
in a single paragraph where its objections are couched in the
broadest terms and where no mention is made of the particular
facts of the Anway litigation. I quote:
"While the advocates of this measure insist that the pro-
73 Section 1.
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ceedings authorized by the act do not constitute a moot case,
and while the proceedings may not square in all particulars
with the technical definition of a moot case, they are such in
every essential. The act contemplates determinations of ab-
stract prop6sitions of law before any cause of action has ac-
crued or before any wrong has been committed, or before any
damages have been occasioned or threatened; it does not con-
template final process to put the determination of the court
into force unless there be a further proceeding on application
by petition. Section 3. It contemplates construction of ceeas
and written instruments when no one is questioning their con-
struction, and the determination of rights under contracts
which have never been breached and never will be. In short, it
requires that the time of the court shall be taken, not in the
determination of actual controversies where rights have been
invaded and wrongs have been done, but in the giving of ad-
vice to all who may seek it. If the proceedings do not square
with the technical definition of a 'moot case' they possess all
its objectionable characteristics, 'and in every essential it at-
tempts to legalize what before was considered by many courts
and text-writers a contempt of court-the presentation of a
moot case.74
An examination of these charges is in order. "The act contem-
plates determinations of abstract propositions of law." This is
true of any legal case in one sense, for every judgment has its ra-
tiones decidendi; certainly it is nothing peculiar to an action for
declaratory relief. "Before any cause of action has accrued or
before any wrong has been committed or before any damages have
been occasioned." All this is true, but it is equally true of all
suits based on threatened injury-all preventive relief. "Or
threatened." This is not true; the object of declaratory relief is
to get a declaration of rights when the parties disagree as to their
legal rights and each threatens to act in accordance with his
opinion concerning them. "It does not contemplate final process,
etc." This is entirely true, and is the purpose of the statute. "It
contemplates construction of deeds and other written instruments
when no one is questioning their construction." This is not true;
no action would be brought if someone did not question their con-
struction. Moreover if action were brought frivolously, the court
might properly dismiss the action. "And the determination of
rights under contracts which have not been breached and never
-, 211 Mich. 592. 604, 179 N. W. 350, 354 (1920).
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will be." In these last words the court goes in for prophecy. It
there is not a bona fide controversy, the court would refuse relief.
If there is a bona fide controversy, though there has been no breach,
the court will give the declaratory relief as a preventive of breach.
"In shor, it requires that the time of the court shall be taken . . .
in giving advice to all who may seek it." This is not true. The
act authorizes the court to give judgment, not advice, to all who seek
it, having a genuine legal dispute.
From this blanket indictment, all that emerges as a valid charge
is that the statute "does not contemplate final process." Now if this
alone makes cases moot, then we have again the proposition that
power to give an executory judgment is essential to judicial power,
stated in a new form. All the examples of declaratory relief and all
the argument that has already been advanced go to show that there
is no such constitutional principle.
A moot case is objectionable because it is not based on facts-
the situation is fictitious or hypothetical-a situation to which the
declaratory judgment statute does not apply. The statute says:
"No action . . . shall be open to objection on the ground
that a merely declaratory judgment . . . is sought thereby,
and the court may make binding declarations of right whether
any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not."
The effect of the statute, therefore, is solely to remove a heretofore
existing obstacle to adjudication of cases where only declaratory re-
lief is desired or perhaps, possible. The provision in the Kansas
statute that there must be "actual antagonistic assertion and denial
of right" seems to have been inserted merely to make it "fool-
proof" -in view of the Anway Case. The Michigan statute does no
more than it purports to do; it removes a single obstacle. It allows
preventive relief where before only reparative relief after injury
could be given. It enables the court, for instance, when the meaning
of a will is sought, to give a constrdction of it binding the parties as
in Barton v. Barton71 and relieves it from the necessity of dismiss-
ing the ease as in Greeley v. Nashua.78 From this New Hampshire
case the Michigan court quotes as follows:
"The plaintiffs take whatever they may be entitled to under
the will, not in their character as executors, or in trust, but in
their own right. They present no question touching the proper
- 283 Ill. 338, 119 N .E. 320 (1918).
76 62 N. H. 166 (1882).
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disposition of trust funds but request the court to inform them
what their legal rights. and those of the defendants are in the
property devised. The court might with equal propriety be call-
ed upon by the parties interested to advise them regarding the
title of land, the construction of a contract, or any other ques-
tion of law. Such questions are not ordinarily adjudicated
until it becomes necessary to decide them in proceedings in-
stituted for the redress of wrongs." 7
To this I will add the succeeding sentence from the New Hampshire
opinion:
"They are prospectively determined by a court of equity in
behalf of trustees who in the execution of their trust are en-
titled to its protection."
This sentence gives us light as to the grounds of the New Hampshire
decision. The court does not call this a moot case. It recognizes that
exactly what is here requested is done when instructions are given
to trustees. The court refuses to extend the relief to others than
trustees on grounds of precedent or policy, not on any constitutional
grounds. The court recognizes that "trustees are entitled to its
protection" in prevention of breach of trust. What the Michigan
statute does is to say that contractors and other persons are like-
wise entitled to court protection in prevention of breach of con-
tract or other legal rights. The analogy seems perfect. There is a
mere extension of preveitive relief to new situations.
m. CONCLUSION
I have said nothing about constitutive or investitive judgments,
those that create new jural relations without being executory in
the sense of requiring the losing party to do something or to suf-
fer something to be done to him. A decree of divorce is of this kind
while the accompanying award of alimony is executory. A decree
of dissolution of a voidable marriage is also of this kind but a de-
cree like that in Kitzman v. Werner-8 declaring that a marriage is
void is only declaratory. It is merely a declaration that a jural rela-
tion, supposed to exist, does not exist. It does not change the act-
ually existing relation. It was chiefly of these investitive judg-
ments that the New York Appellate Division was speaking in
Matter of Mitchel v. Cropsey.79
77 211 Mich. 592, 614, 179 N. W. 350, 358 (1920).
7 Supra, note 43.
TO See also 1 ELLIOTT. GENERAL PRACTCw, J 246.
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1921], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss1/2
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Since investitive judgments are recognized as constitutional, an
argument might be adduced for the constitutionality of declaratory
judgments from their analogy to investitive ones. But such an
argument seems to me needless in view of the sufficiency bf the
analogy furnished by the many classes of declaratory judgments
already recognized as exercises of the judicial power.
I have endeavored to demolish the foundation of the majority in
the Anway Case by showing that the conduct authorized by the
Michigan declaratory judgment statute is not unconstitutional on
either of the grounds upon which the court relies. It does not re-
quire nor purport to authorize non-judicial acts. It does not confer
a power to decide moot cases or to give nugatory judgments. It en-
ables the court to give binding judgments in settlement of jural
relations. If it be admitted that the foundation of the majority op-
inion is bad, what constitutional objection remains to this statute?
It is difficult to conceive that any can be urged. Moreover if any
is offered, it is difficult to see why it will not apply equally to some
or all the classes of cases which I have enumerated, in which dec-
laratory judgments are already in use and recognized as valid.
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The only considerable expression of opposition to the declara-
tory judgment either on constitutional or other grounds that I
have discovered is in the majority opinion in the Anway Case.
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